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A B S T R A C T 
Objective: The objective of the paper is to identify how the concept of sustainability is 
understood and ensured in the pension systems of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; and 
what implications it brings to the performance of pension schemes. 
Research Design & Methods: Analysis of various conceptual and methodological ap-
proaches to the notion of sustainability of pension systems. Comparative analysis of 
present pension legislation, as well as preceding stage of pension reforms, accompa-
nied by a number of numerical models. 
Findings: The understanding of sustainability is limited by narrow ‘fiscal’ meaning in 
Latvia, compared to more a multifaceted concept that includes the principle of social 
fairness and which can be traced in the logic of Estonian and Lithuanian legislators. 
Implications & Recommendations: In the long-term, pure financial appreciation of sus-
tainability is misleading, low level of credibility may cripple a financially sound but so-
cially unfair system; the perceived unfairness of redistribution can undermine the pub-
lic support to, and, therefore, sustainability of pension systems. 
Contribution & Value Added: The originality of this work lies in studying how differ-
ences at policy formulation stage and in the very design of pension schemes influence 
pension system sustainability in countries with a very similar initial conditions and so-
cio-economic environment. 
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The notion of sustainability has many dimensions and many aspects. Firstly, this term 
emerged in environmental sciences, but quite soon this approach was caught up by schol-
ars in other fields, as well as by politicians, and now can be addressed to economic sectors 
and individual enterprises, ecosystems, countries, lifestyles, etc. When this “yardstick” is 
applied to social insurance, particularly, to public pensions provision, it is worth comparing 
interpretations of the term purported by different actors. Since 2001, the provision of ad-
equate, safe and sustainable pensions is a confirmed common objective at EU level. Gen-
erally, the main challenge pension systems sustainability is seen in the ageing of modern 
European societies and increasing burdens on public finances undermining fiscal sustain-
ability (EC, 2010). However, social practices in the area of social security, or social sustain-
ability (Rasnaca & Niklass, 2014, p. 13) are less commonly considered as a risk factor to a 
pension system. 
We would like to consider how the concept of sustainability is understood and, con-
sequently, ensured in the pension systems of the Baltic States. These countries have very 
much in common historically; they inherited the same social security systems from the 
former Soviet Union and underwent concurrent reforms in 1990s. In the middle of 1990s 
countries in transition were under the influence of a three-pillar model of pension systems 
propagated by the World Bank (World Bank, 1994). Therefore the general structure of re-
formed Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian systems is practically the same and includes: 
1. mandatory public pay-as-you-go pillar; 
2. mandatory private funded pillar (voluntary in the case of Lithuania, but the vast ma-
jority of the working-age population are participating); and 
3. voluntary private pension funds. 
Funded pillars function similarly, with some minor variations in secondary elements 
of their design, and their sustainability depends mainly on the overall ability of financial 
markets to cope with the global challenges that the world economy is and will be facing. 
Experts point out that “financial crisis in 2008 and 2009 and currently ongoing crisis in euro 
zone countries indicated that the pension systems in Baltic countries were not properly 
protected against the real economic risks, which were related to long term unemployment 
and decrease of return rates below inflation rates, for instruments such as term deposits 
and government bonds, which historically were considered no risk financial investments” 
(Bitinas & Maccioni, 2014, p. 17).  
Among significant differences between the three Baltic States pension systems, public 
pension benefit formulas stand out. In order to trace the “roots” of those differences one 
has to look back into policy formulation stages. The aim of the paper is to identify how the 
concept of sustainability is understood and ensured in the pension systems of the three 
Baltic countries. 
  




Policy Formulation: Pension Reforms in the Baltic States 
Many authors have stressed linkages between the policy formation and implementation 
processes. Danish researcher Soren Winter (1990) has identified that successful imple-
mentation is likely to be positively related by the level of attention by the policy propo-
nents in the policy formation process. Level of attention is affected by the length of the 
decision-making period, the number of participants, and the number of competing issues 
on the agenda. Attention to one particular policy is affected by the way policies are 
grouped into the reform packages. Therefore, limited attention tends to produce decisions 
where no direct relationship and internal consistency among policy formation, policy goals 
and designs, policy implementation can be expected (Winter, 1990, pp. 25-26). 
Pension reform in Latvia was performed with the active participation and with the 
guidance of the World Bank experts, who, inter alia, recommended Latvian legislators to 
adopt a then innovated Swedish concept of notional defined contribution individual pen-
sion accounts. Swedish specialists played a leading role in designing the reform in Latvia, 
while Latvians almost fully relied upon their experience and competence. From the very 
beginning, the working pension reform preparation group consisted only of two experts 
from the Latvian Ministry of Welfare and three Swedish experts. Despite that, all political 
parties in the Saeima (Latvian Parliament) supported the principles of pension reform pre-
sented by the working group to the government and then to the legislature in the begin-
ning of March 1995. As a result, the law has passed the parliament very fast (in November 
1995), the debates were short and no wide audience participated in discussions 
(Vanovska, 2006). Dominating issues on public and policy agenda were connected with 
severe banking crisis in Latvia in the spring and summer 1995 and national elections in 
autumn 1995. Latvia was the first country in the world to launch the notional defined con-
tributions (NDC) system in January 1996. Under this scheme, the entire state-provided 
pension is dependent on individual’s contributions to his or her notional pension account. 
As noted by Katarine Muller (2006), “it also led to the adoption of transition rules for the 
new NDC system that were highly arbitrary and created many horizontal inequities among 
similarly situated persons.” 
In Lithuania, a more dominant role was played by the Lithuanian Free Market Institute 
(LFMI), an NGO supported by the Cato Institute, a libertarian think tank in Washington, 
D.C. which has long sought to dismantle social security in the US. Romas Lazutka (2006) 
describes how, through a series of critical newspaper articles in the mid-1990s, the LFMI 
planted the seeds of public discontent with the state pension system. These articles por-
trayed the Chilean pension system as ideal for Lithuania. As to other intra-government 
actors, the Lithuanian Ministry of Social Security and Labour initially showed the typical 
Bismarckian-Beveridgean stance, defending social security and opposing the move to-
wards mandatory prefunding. As elsewhere, this Ministry proved too weak to prevent pen-
sion privatisation, however. 
Estonians were more cautious; they did not use any external assistance, demonstrated 
a much stronger self-reliance, and organised broad public and political debates on the re-
form. The draft law (prepared in 1997) was discussed in tripartite negotiations among the 
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Cabinet, employers, and trade unions to allow for the different potentially affected inter-
ests to be integrated in the draft. Compared with Latvia and Sweden, the Estonian state-
provided pension scheme financed from the social security tax, consists of three different 
layers: a minimum flat pension rate, a contribution-related share (calculated based on co-
efficients rather than on exact contributions), and a share dependent on the length of em-
ployment. A possibility of implementing NDC was considered but rejected. The policymak-
ers specifically stated that the system was developed independently and did not copy any 
existing systems in other countries (Tavits, 2003, p. 647). Their current so called “point 
system” resembles German and French schemes, and was launched three years later, in 
1999. We fully agree with the conclusion of researcher M. Tavits that “the Estonian reform 
process was open, driven by collaborative networks, and relied on local activism, whereas 
the Latvian reform process was closed and accommodated fewer interests” (Tavits, 2003, 
p. 649). 
Sustainability: Conceptual and Methodological Approaches 
Generally, international experts recognize that the study countries have managed to 
achieve a relatively high level of sustainability. For instance Allianz Global Investors re-
search group are computing what they call a “Pension Sustainability Index” (PSI). Three 
such reports edited by Dr Renate Finke have been published: in 2009, 2011 and 2014. The 
authors of the PSI are awarding Latvia and Estonia with the best scores not only among 
Eastern Europe: Latvia takes the first place and Estonia the second one, then follows Russia 
(that would lose such high score should the very recent pension reform be taken into ac-
count by Allianz experts), and Lithuania takes the fourth place in the region, - but also 
compared to many developed countries – better than the United Kingdom, Canada, Fin-
land Germany, Austria, France, Luxembourg and many others.  
For the purpose of this article, the fundamental issue is not the high scoring, but the 
meaning of “sustainability” that the above experts are attributing: what factors are taken 
into account. In the methodology description Allianz provides the “overview of sub- indi-
cators that would weight results positively: 
− The national pension system has been designed to meet the needs of an aging society, 
e.g.: 
o the first pillar PAYG system offers moderate benefits and covers a large percentage 
of the workforce; 
o the legal retirement age is high and/or is linked to life expectancies; 
o funded pillars are in place to provide additional old-age income. 
− National demographics do not put much pressure on reform, e.g.: 
o the old-age dependency ratio is favourable; 
o any changes in the work-to-retirement balance are expected to be moderate; 
− The government is in a position to cushion reform pressures, e.g.: 
o public pension payments are low; 
o the state has deep pockets so that in can either take on more debt or increase the 
burden on the economy to finance rising pension payments.” 
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Another think tank of pension financial experts, Australian Centre for Financial Stud-
ies, starting from 2009, annually calculates another index: Melbourne Mercer Global Pen-
sion Index. The team of the researched includes professors from Oxford University, Uni-
versity of Toronto, University of Melbourne, and other institutions. This year it has been 
calculated for the 6th time, and covered 25 countries across the world (the Baltic States 
are not included in this short list). The overall index value for each country represents the 
weighted average of the three sub-indices. The weightings used are: 40% for the adequacy 
sub-index + 35% for the sustainability sub-index + 25% for the integrity sub-index. Each 
sub-index is based on a set of indicators. The sustainability sub-index considers a number 
of indicators that include: economic importance of the private pension system, its level of 
funding, the length of expected retirement both now and in the future, the labour force 
participation rate of the older population and the current level of government debt. Thus, 
one can find practically the same set of parameters as are used by Allianz Group. 
These approaches are also similar to the one of the World Bank experts whose defini-
tion of sustainability of a pension system is the following: “a sustainable system is one that 
is financially sound and can be maintained over a foreseeable horizon under a broad set 
of reasonable assumptions” (Holzmann et al., 2008).  
The same logic can be found in the indicator of financial sustainability gap S2, devised 
by the European Commission’s Working Group on Ageing, with a focus on how population 
ageing contributes to the fiscal sustainability gap (Zaidi, 2010). The S2 indicator approxi-
mates the gap (as % of GDP) that must be closed permanently in order to ensure that 
governments will be able to finance all future public budget obligations. The indicator pro-
vides a compact measure to approximate the size of risks to public finance sustainability 
when a long-term perspective is taken. The S2 indicator can be decomposed into two com-
ponents so as to also point to the sources of the risks and appropriate policy response 
required. Firstly, there is the gap arising due to the starting fiscal position, referred to as 
the Initial Budgetary Position. Secondly, there are the additional costs related to popula-
tion ageing and expenditures on pensions, healthcare and long-term care. This component 
is referred to as the Long Term Changes. While Estonia demonstrated low values (lower 
than EU average), both Lithuania and Latvia were classified into the group of the countries 
with high sustainability gap, thus having higher risks of underfinancing future obligations. 
Aaron George Grech of London School of Economics argues that “there appear to be 
four concerns in terms of ensuring pension system sustainability. From a political economy 
perspective, the adequacy of the system for the average voter needs to be ensured. If a 
system is not seen as beneficial by the electoral majority, namely by not helping them 
maintain their pre-retirement living standards, it could be voted out. Similarly, if a system 
is not seen as able to alleviate poverty, the political pressures that led to the setting up of 
social assistance to elderly people during the early part of the twentieth century might re-
emerge. In the process of achieving these two goals, policymakers need, however, to take 
into consideration the balance of transfers between different generations. Political pres-
sures for reform can arise either because systems are not achieving the goals that individ-
uals expect of them or because individuals are unhappy about the deal they are getting 
compared to previous generations. Individuals can be concerned about the level of taxes 
they pay to finance the system, but also by the level of their pension transfers compared 
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to previous generations. Social sustainability can only be achieved if policymakers under-
stand these tradeoffs and optimise pension systems in this light.” (Grech, 2010, p. 11) The 
aspect of adequacy will not be discussed in detail in this paper; those interested are invited 
to address the author’s article “Pensions Adequacy in the Baltic Region” (Rajevska, 2014). 
Here I would like to draw the reader’s attention to one more dimension, tangentially men-
tioned by Dr Grech. This dimension can be traced in other sources, as well.  
Thus, according to OECD definition (OECD, 2009), “fiscal sustainability implies four 
main characteristics: 
− solvency, or governments’ ability to finance existing and probable future liabilities/ ob-
ligations; 
− growth, or the capacity of government to sustain economic growth over an extended 
period; 
− fairness, or governments’ ability to provide net financial benefits to future generations 
that are not less than the net benefits provided to current generations; [emphasis added 
– O.R.] and 
− stable taxes, or the capacity of governments to finance future obligations without in-
creasing the tax burden.” 
A similar, yet more multifaceted approach to pension’s sustainability can be found in 
EU documents (EC, 2010): 
“Member States are committed to providing […] the financial sustainability of public 
and private pension schemes, bearing in mind pressures on public finances and the ageing 
of populations, and in the context of the three-pronged strategy for tackling the budgetary 
implications of ageing, notably by: supporting longer working lives and active ageing; by 
balancing contributions and benefits in an appropriate and socially fair manner; [emphasis 
added – O.R.] and by promoting the affordability and the security of funded and private 
schemes; […]”. 
Krzysztof Hagemejer and John Woodall (2014) note that the understanding of the “so-
cially fair manner” is likely to differ significantly as between different societies, at different 
times, and in differing economic conditions: 
“The designs and shapes of pension systems are usually the result of social contracts, 
which may be more or less explicit in character. Societies define their objectives through 
an ongoing debate around a following set of questions: 
− What should “retirement” (as a status) represent: simply the condition of a person who 
is no longer able to work, or rather a well- deserved period of rest after working life? 
− At what age or after how many years of a working career should retirement (as an 
event) typically take place? 
− What level of benefits is seen as appropriate by the society as representing an adequate 
guarantee to its elderly members – should this comprise only the alleviation of poverty 
for those unable to support themselves, a (defined) minimum income for all residents 
in old-age, or a guaranteed level of replacement rates (as a proportion of pre-retire-
ment income)? 
− What is the desired degree of solidarity in financing the incomes of retired persons; 
should individuals save for themselves, should the younger generation(s) support the 
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elderly as a matter of principle; or should support be restricted to a minimal level for 
those unable to save enough for their own needs?” (Hagemejer & Woodall, 2014). 
For example, Latvian researches add the following criteria to the list of necessary con-
ditions making Latvian pension sustainable: a) a substantial part of the retired persons’ 
welfare will be depending on family support (Puķis & Dundure, 2012); and b) reversal of 
gender discrimination should be achieved (Dundure, 2013). 
Furthermore, the EU documents stress that “the sustainability of PAYG pensions ulti-
mately depends on the strength of the underlying economy, such as fewer people working 
and paying contributions, lower economic growth and depending also on institutional ar-
rangements on national public debt” (EC, 2012b). Therefore, not only financial indicators 
should be looked at when assessing sustainability, but also (and even more important) 
other parameters of economic life: productivity, competitive ability, embeddedness into 
global chains, infrastructure, and many others. 
MATERIAL AND METHODS 
The analysed literature led to formulation of two research hypotheses: 
1. Differences at policy formulation stage in the levels of involvedness of foreign actors 
resulted in significant dissimilarities at implementation stage. 
2. Different actors read different meanings in the notion of sustainability. A narrower, 
purely fiscal, or a broader, socially oriented interpretation of the term can be traced 
in the design and performance of pension schemes in three Baltic States. 
In order to see what understanding of sustainability prevails among legislators of the 
study countries, the institutional designs of existing pension systems are analysed. Com-
prehensive descriptions of the status quo can be found in the most recent ASISP country 
reports on pensions, health and long-term care: for Estonia (Vork & Paat-Ahi, 2013), Latvia 
(Zilvere, 2013) and Lithuania (Medaiskis & Jankauskiene, 2013). Normative acts and regu-
lations in force are obtained at the web-sites of state social insurance bodies: the Social 
Insurance Board of the Republic of Estonia (http://www.sotsiaalkindlustusamet.ee), the 
State Social Insurance Agency of the Republic of Latvia (http://www.vsaa.gov.lv) and the 
State Social Insurance Fund Board of the Republic of Lithuania (http://www.sodra.lt). All 
three institutions also provide statistical data on pensions. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Pension Systems of the Baltic States – Current Status 
The first-pillar benefit in Estonia and Lithuania comprises of two main components: a basic 
non-contributory one (in Estonia it is absolutely flat and presently – December, 2014 – 
equals to EUR 126.82, in Lithuania it depends on the length of service and lies in the inter-
val from EUR 62.56 to EUR 125.11), and an insurance component, constructed quite simi-
larly in the two countries and based on what is called a point-system. A person is annually 
awarded with a number of points that are equal to the ratio between his/her salary and 
nationwide average insured wage in the respective year (average insured wage differs 
from average wage, since the first takes into account those unemployed, on sick-leave, on 
maternity or child-care leave, etc.). Thus, if one’s salary was equal to the average insured 
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wage – s/he gets one point, if it was twice higher than average – two points, if twice lower 
– 0.5 points, and so on. The points earned throughout the working career are then sum-
marized, and the sum multiplied by the monetary value of one year. There is also the third 
component for the pre-reform service period (however, it is losing its importance as the 
years go by), and it is calculated likewise. In Estonia, all pre-reform years of service (i.e. 
those before 1 January 1999) have a value of one point, irrespectively of actual earnings. 
In Lithuania for each pre-reform year of service (i.e. those before 1 January 1994), a person 
gets as many points, as was his/her average ratio in post-reform working career (or as was 
his ratio in 1984-1993 if reliable wage data for this period is available). 
Both the basic component and the monetary value of one year are from time to time 
revised and approved by the government. In Estonia, the law prescribes annual revisions 
according to strict and univocal rules: a) in no case these values can decrease, even in 
periods of deflation and/or downfall in average insured wage; and b) the basic component 
grows faster than the monetary value of one year. In Lithuania, both figures are approved 
discretionary, which makes easier to manipulate the flattening (by increasing the basic 
part) and differentiation (by increasing the one-year value) of pensions. There is no rule 
prohibiting diminution, and in 2009 the monetary value of one year was even lowered by 
21.4% (but the basic part was concomitantly increased by 9.1%). 
Latvian first-pillar benefits do not include any basic flat component. The benefit is 
earned by all insured individuals by “directing” part of their social insurance contributions 
to the personalized notional pension capital account. No actual money transfer takes 
place, this capital exists only as a record in State Social Insurance Agency database, and 
the whole scheme is known as NDC: notional (or, in another abbreviation expansion, also 
‘non-financial’) defined-contribution. The pension value is the sum of notional capital at 
retirement divided by the projected life expectancy at retirement age. The notional capital 
for the pre-reform period (years of service prior to 1996) is calculated based on average 
actual personal earnings in 1996-1999, and this rule is extremely unfair to those whose 
wages were low, unemployed or those employed in shadow economy (that was quite 
widespread in 1990s). 
The below diagram (Figure 1) shows a theoretical old-age pension benefit for a person 
with 40 years of employment record whose wage during all his/her working life was chang-
ing in accordance with changes of average countrywide wage. Although in the case of av-
erage wage the resulting figures for Estonia and Latvia are quite close, the difference for 
those having earned twice more or twice less than average is very clearly visible. Lithuania 
has the lowest nominal pension benefits, but if one expresses them in purchasing power 
(and not in EUR), the difference will become much smaller. Latvia also implies the highest 
income taxes on pensions, as well as to employment earnings (Skačkauskienė, 2013). 
It is recognized (see, for example, Chlon-Dominczak & Strzelecki, 2013) that NDC sys-
tems almost lack redistribution instruments, and therefore are not adequate for countries 
with a relatively large gap between the rich and the poor (and Latvia has the highest GINI 
index in Europe) – material stratification is not smoothed in old age, and combined with 
low replacement rates, it leads to massive poverty: almost 60% of Latvian pensioners get 
a net pension benefit lower than the official subsistence minimum, meanwhile 0.5% get 
more than 1000 euro per month, and there are pensions of 5000 euro and higher. 
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Figure 1. Pension benefit for a person retiring in December 2014 with 40 years service record 
(EUR) depending on his/her wage 
Source: own calculations based on statistical (historical average insured wages in Latvia) and normative data 
of national social insurance boards. 
The accrued notional capital is annually valorised (up-rated) in line with increase in 
the covered wage bill. These annual indices imitate the role of interest rates in funded 
schemes. When the total amount of wages on a nationwide scale drops below the last year 
figure – the interest rate is negative, and all prospective pensioners will suffer lower pen-
sions. This mechanism was incorporated into the system in order to maintain financial 
sustainability in times when the cardinality of cohorts entering the labour market is lower 
than the cardinality of cohorts retiring from the labour market. It was anticipated that the 
constant growth in wage rates and labour productivity would neutralise the effect of de-
creasing working population and the index therefore would manage to remain above one. 
Massive emigration, accompanied by wage-cuts and sharp rise in unemployment in the 
crisis years resulted in negative pension capital indexation in three successive years 2009-
2011, and the average amount of a newly-awarded pension benefit dropped by 15% in the 
first quarter of 2012 compared to the first quarter of 2009. Abolition of the so-called “sup-
plements” (one euro per each pre-reform year of service, i.e. prior to 1996) for newly 
awarded pensions from 2012 had enhanced this tendency. It was calculated, that a person 
with 45 years’ service record who was receiving the average nationwide wage throughout 
his/her career retiring in 2009 got a 24% higher benefit, than a similar person retiring in 
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2012 did. Pension indexation rules have been recently amended in Latvia, the pre-crisis 
formula was prescribing annual indexation according to changes in the consumer price 
index, but it was revoked in 2009, and since then the government has only made ad hoc 
indexation of small pensions (not exceeding 285 euros) in 2013. In 2014 another ad hoc 
indexation took place: indexation was applied to all pensions, but only to the part below 
285 euros. Further on, the threshold amount for indexation will be set at 50% of average 
insured wage, and the indexation ratio is to be based on both consumer price index (75%) 
and increase in the covered wage bill (25%). 
Thus, both Latvian and Estonian pension systems include similar balancing mecha-
nisms of matching the assets with liabilities by annual wage-bill index (total amount of 
wages paid nationwide). Estonian legislation prohibits diminution in benefits for the 
newly-qualified pensioners: for the same service record (same contributions) they will get 
as much as those who already enjoy retirement, while valorisation of notional pension 
capital in Latvian scheme generates serious distortions: if we compare two pensioners 
with the same service record – for instance, 45 years of service and average salary, a per-
son who retired in 2010 received (and is still receiving) a 24% higher benefit than one who 
retired in 2012. 
 
Figure 2. Pension benefit for a person retiring in December 2014 with 40 years service record 
(EUR) and average wage, depending on NDC valorisation rules (what-if simulation) 
Source: own calculations based on statistical data of the State Social Insurance Board (historical average 
insured wages) and Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia (consumer price indices and GDP). 
This is not an intrinsic feature of NDC – valorisation rules differ among countries, for 
instance indexation of notional capital in Poland is linked not only to the wage-bill index, 
but also to consumer price index (and in no case can it be lower than inflation), in Sweden, 
valorisation ratio is linked to average wage growth (3-year sliding average), in Italy – to 
GDP growth (5-year sliding average). Should Latvia have also adopted such valorisation 
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Indexation of notional pension capital in Latvia can be negative, and it was negative 
during the three consecutive years 2009-2012. The effective value of contributions made 
prior to 2008 has contracted by almost one third from 2009 to 2012. 
The system is designed so as to achieve the balance between the inflows and outflows 
as fast as possible and at the expense of individual participants, who bear all the risks. 
There are possibilities of premature retirement (up to two years before the legally 
stipulated retirement age in Latvia, three years in Estonia and five years in Lithuania), but 
in such case the amount of pension is reduced. The premature pension benefit makes 50% 
of an ordinary calculation in Latvia irrespectively of the time left until the official pension 
age, while in Estonia and Lithuania, the amount the premature benefit is reduced by 0.4% 
for each month falling short of the legally stipulated retirement age (4.8% per year). As to 
the postponed retirement, in Estonia the pension benefit is increased by 0.9% for each 
month by which a person postpones his or her application for the pension (that is 10.8% 
per year), in Lithuania the pension is increased by 8% for each year of postponement. In 
Latvia, since the factor of average life expectancy is a part of general formula, the benefit 
is automatically increased when a person opts to retire later than the official pensionable 
age and no additional incentives for late retirement are provided. 
The second pillar is mandatory in Estonia for people born in 1983 and later and in 
Latvia for people born on July 1, 1971 and later. Participation is voluntary in Lithuania ir-
respective of age, voluntary for those born between July 2, 1951 and June 30, 1971 in 
Latvia, and was open for voluntary subscription until October 31, 2010 for those born in 
1942-1983 in Estonia. Those who have joined the 2nd pillar voluntarily do not have the 
right to “change their mind” and leave the pillar, with the only exclusion for the period 
from 01/04/2013 till 30/11/2013 in Lithuania, where they could switch back to fully PAYG 
scheme in Lithuania while their accumulated accounts will be managed by pension accu-
mulation companies until their retirement age (by the end of the transition period 24 thou-
sands or 2.1% of the 2nd pillar participants had used this opportunity). Practically, almost 
all potential voluntary participants have exercised their right to join the II pillar because of 
massive advertising campaign by private pension funds. However, recent studies (Bartkus, 
2013) demonstrate that capital growth in the majority of pension plans is insufficient to 
provide the adequate amounts of future pension annuities (as was anticipated at the time 
of introduction of the funded pillar). 
In Estonia and Lithuania, if a participant dies before reaching the pension age, units of 
mandatory funded pensions are inheritable. In Latvia, on a contributor’s death, funds are 
returned to the first pillar and subsumed in the overall pensions budget. 
While the role of funded pillars is increasing with the ageing of population they do not 
contribute to ensuring compliance with the equitability goal: benefits in funded schemes 
are very much depending on rates of return produced by the pension plan(s) chosen by a 
participant, and on volatile security markets. Thus the rule “same benefits for same con-
tributions” conflicts the very nature of funded pillars. No redistribution from lifetime rich 
to lifetime poor is provided in these pillars, as well. Even more, promotion of third pillar 
voluntary pension plans (by granting tax reliefs on the contributions made to private 
funds) can be successful only among those persons who have enough “extra” money that 
can be directed to long-term savings. Those who live from paycheck to paycheck can 
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hardly afford to withdraw any additional amounts from their household budgets and can-
not, therefore, expect any significant third-pillar supplement to their mandatory 1st and 
2nd pillar old-age pension benefits. This effect is further enhanced by the level of financial 
literacy: as shown in recent international research findings (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2011), peo-
ple with higher levels of education – who, as a rule, have higher incomes and therefore 
make larger contributions to pension funds, - are better informed in financial matters and 
are less vulnerable to risks of choosing an inappropriate investment strategy. These con-
clusions are supported by Latvian researches as well in respect of this country (Stavausis, 
2013). Less educated persons, whose incomes are lower, are more exposed to the risk of 
making a wrong investment choice. In this context, funded pillars are rendering a disser-
vice to lifetime poor, causing further distortion in income distribution at old age. The larger 
share of total pension tax goes to the second pillar – the higher degree of inequity the 
system generates. 
The design of Latvian system was strongly influenced by the narrow understanding of 
sustainability, i.e. pure balancing assets with liabilities; such aspect fairness (or equity in 
other terms) is lacking in Latvian pension scheme. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The approach realized in Latvian pension legislation can be considered as a solution for 
financial sustainability in its very narrow sense. In our opinion, it is to a great extent rooted 
in the strong influence of the World Bank experts on pension reform orchestration in 
1990s. In the Latvian pension scheme, all the risks of contemporary globalized economy 
to the maximum extent have been transferred to the taxpayers. Pension systems in Esto-
nia and Lithuania demonstrate more signs of a fair distribution of benefits and risks both 
in the I and II pillars, and therefore have better compliance with the principles of social 
sustainability. Meanwhile, the Estonian system is the most transparent and has the most 
clearly defined “rules of the game”. 
A pension system cannot be sustainable when people do not trust in it. The level of 
credibility granted to pension system by the population is significantly higher in Estonia. 
Public opinion polls show that Estonians are much less concerned about whether their 
income at old age will be sufficient to live in dignity, demonstrating more positive results 
than EU average. Estonians return higher ratings when requested to evaluate the situation 
with pension provision in their country and its anticipated development; they are, on the 
one hand, more aware of coming population ageing, but, on the other hand, less worried 
about this fact. They demonstrate significantly higher level of credibility in their pension 
system. The numbers of emigrants from Latvia and Lithuania are by an order of magnitude 
greater than from Estonia, in general – Latvian and Lithuanian people are less motivated 
to pay taxes honestly, thus reducing the taxation base and increasing the burden on those 
who are paying, and in the long-term, such policy does not seem sustainable at all. In our 
opinion, the misleading purely financial perception of sustainability prevailing among Lat-
vian decision makers is caused by the nature of policy design at the policy formulation and 
implementation stages. 
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